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ii

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
CaseNo.970539-CA
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Priority 2
vs.
ROY WOMACK II,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge
John C. Backlund, denying appellant's Motion to Suppress Evidence following a
hearing and from final judgment of conviction for Possession of a Controlled
Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) & 58-37-8(4) (a), following a conditional plea, said
judgment having been entered July 23,1997. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)Q (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Was there sufficient probable cause set forth in the affidavit in

support of the search warrant to provide the necessary probable cause for
issuance of the search warrant?
2. Does the issuance of an "anticipatory" search warrant violate the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-202, Article I Section 14 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah, or the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States?
A trial Court's legal conclusions are reviewed for "correctness." State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). A Court's statutory interpretation is
reviewed for "correctness." State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah App. 1993).
The factual findings underlying the issuance of a search warrant are reviewed under
a "clearly erroneous" standard, but the conclusions of law based thereon are
reviewed for "correctness." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-202.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appealfroma judgment against Roy Womack II, for one (1) count
of Possession of a Controlled Substance in a DrugfreeZone, a Class A
2

Misdemeanor. Following the denial of Appellant's Motion to Suppress after hearing
and argument, Appellant, pursuant to plea agreement and State v. Sery, 758 P.2d
935 (Utah App. 1988), entered a plea of no contest to said charge. The Court's
order of judgment was entered on July 23,1997.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter was submitted to the trial Court upon stipulated facts which both
parties agreed were correctly set forth in the factual statement contained in the
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress with some additions
by Plaintiff. A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of
the Court Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress is attached hereto as Addendum
"A". A copy of Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress is also
attached hereto as Addendum "B". The facts set forth therein are as follows.
On February 21,1996, UPS attempted to deliver a package addressed to Roy
Womack at 120 West 1200 North in Orem, Utah. The address was not a valid
address, so the UPS employees searched the telephone book and found a Womack
family living in Orem and delivered the package to that family, although the listing
was not for a Roy Womack. The package had a return address identified to Eileen
O'Hara in California. Although there were no Roy Womacks at the residence to
which the package was delivered, the occupants opened the package and looked
3

through its contents, discovering some marijuana. The Womacks then took the
package to the Orem City Police station and turned it over to the Orem City officers.
Six (6) days later, the UPS officer received a callfroma person who
identified herself as Eileen O'Hara, who, upon being told that the package had been
delivered to the wrong address, told the UPS workers to deliver the package to 127
West 1200 North, Orem, Utah. After the package had been turned over to the
police, an individual who claimed to be Roy Womack contacted the Womacks who
had received the package and was informed that the package was not there.
The Orem police determined that the new address was a good address and
that the residents shown as living at that address were John and Kathleen Green.
There was no record of a Roy Womack living at the address. The law enforcement
officers, while still in possession of the package, sought permission of the Court to
conduct a "controlled delivery" of the package and to conduct a search of the
premises for additional evidence including "evidence of possession of the home and
a nexus to the evidence." This request was made by virtue of an Affidavit in
Support of a Search Warrant. The affidavit set forth basically the same facts set
forth above, but included some general nonspecific statements relating to the affiant
officer's experience in the drug enforcement field. The affidavit identified the
residents of the home at 127 West 1200 North, Orem, as John and Kathleen Green,
4

a married couple. There was no statement in the affidavit that indicated any
information which would associate the Greens with Eileen O'Hara or Roy Womack.
There was no information to link the Greens in any way with drug use or drug sales.
(Addendum "C")
Based upon the affidavit, a judge issued the warrant authorizing the officers
to search the residence following the delivery of the UPS package including the
persons and vehicles of any persons present at the time of the delivery. (Addendum
"C") The law enforcement officers then took the package to the residence
accompanied by a UPS delivery person who then delivered the package to the
residence. The person who answered the door identified himself as Roy Womack
and signed for the package. The UPS employee then relayed that information to the
police officers who then entered the residence and apprehended Appellant in
possession of the package and the marijuana.
Following the denial of his Motion to Suppress, Appellant entered a
conditional plea of no contest as part of a plea bargain upon the condition that he
retain therightto appeal the Court's denial of his motion to suppress. Judgment
was entered against the Appellant on July 23,1997.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The lower Court committed reversible error by issuing a search warrant
5

where the affidavit in support thereof did not state sufficient probable cause to
support a warrant. The affidavit in this case did not state sufficient probable cause
to show that the person listed as the addressee on the package lived at the corrected
address, especially in light of the fact that the sender of the package had already put
the wrong address on the package. The statements in the affidavit are, in fact, to the
contrary. The probable cause affidavit did not provide sufficient information to the
magistrate to support the issuance of a warrant.
The issuance of an "anticipatory search warrant" violates the provisions of
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; Article I, Section 14
of the Constitution of the State of Utah; and the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 7723-202 guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The warrant in the present case was not based upon conditions or facts which were
in existence at the time of the issuance of the warrant, but upon future facts which
were in control of the officers. This appears to be a case of first impression in Utah.
Appellant contends that the statutes of this state and our constitutional provisions do
not support the issuance of anticipatory warrants which are contingent upon and
require some further conduct on the part of the police and/or other individuals to
develop probable cause subsequent to the issuance of the warrant. The Court
committed error in denying Appellant's Motion to Suppress.
6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
UPHOLDING A SEARCH WARRANT WHICH WAS NOT BASED
UPON PROBABLE CAUSE.
The affidavit in support of search warrant in this case did not set forth
probable cause sufficient to support a search warrant. The affidavit did not set forth
any reliable evidence that the individual named Roy Womack to whom the package
was addressed resided at the address on the package. The statement in the affidavit
is, in fact, to the contrary. It sets forth that a married couple, John and Kathleen
Green lived at that address and states no reason to believe that either of those
individuals were suspects or that there was any corroborating evidence that drug
activity was being conducted at the residence named in the affidavit. There was no
evidence that any contraband would be located on the premises since the officers
still had the contraband in their possession at thetimeof the application and
issuance of the search warrant. (See Addendum "D")
The case law of the United States interpreting the standard for issuance of
search warrants without violating thefreedomfromunreasonable search and seizure
is set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The Court held that in
determining whether probable cause exists, the magistrate must "make a practical,
7

common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place." 462 U.S. 213, at 239.
Utah case law clearly sets forth the requirement that the affidavit in support of
the search warrant clearly set forth probable cause to believe that the evidence is at
the location sought to be searched. See State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah
App. 1992). The purpose of the requirement is to limit the intrusion of law
enforcement officers to those situations where the intrusion is based upon probable
cause and to eliminate "fishing expeditions" on the part of law enforcement. This is
in contrast to those cases where the postal service may receive a suspect package
and then contacts the addressee to pick up the package. Those situations are based
upon action and acceptance of the contacted individual to come to the post office or
UPS office and claim the package as opposed to the present case. No intrusion of
the home is involved in those situations, nor is the possibility that someone who has
no involvement in criminal activity will have their home invaded by law enforcement
officers. In the present case, the actions of the officers raise that risk, and are not
justified by probable cause that the persons at the residence were in possession of
contraband prior to the delivery of the package.
8

There was no evidence that the person to whom the package was addressed
was aware that the package contained contraband. The Womacks to whom the
package was originally delivered did not discover that the package contained
contraband until they had opened the package. The only evidence set forth in the
affidavit was that a person who claimed to be Roy Womack asked the Womacks, to
whom the package had been delivered, if they had received a package. Under the
ruling of the lower Court in this case, a person who received an unsolicited package
which contained a controlled substance, could have his home searched and could be
prosecuted for possession without any other showing demonstrating his prior
knowledge of the contents once he or she accepted delivery of the package.
Clearly, the Court would not support issuance of a warrant in a case where
the officers introduced contraband into a residence in order to establish probable
cause to search the residence. In the present case, where the officers did not know
or establish that the person to whom the package was addressed actually lived at the
corrected residence, their introduction of the evidence into the residence through the
agency of UPS causes a similar situation.
At the time of the issuance of the warrant the only evidence of contraband
was that which set forth that the contraband was in the possession of the police, not
any other person, including Appellant. The search warrant issued (see Addendum
9

"D") falsely sets forth in paragraph 2, that the property sought to be seized is "most
probably located at the premises also set forth below." The warrant authorized the
search of the residence within ten (10) daysfromthe date of issuance without any
requirement that the substance be delivered specifically to Roy Womack. Further, in
paragraph 3 of the search warrant, the Court stated: "The person or entity in
possession of the property is a party to the alleged illegal conduct." There was no
statement set forth in the affidavit in support of the search warrant to indicate that
the person to whom the package was addressed knew it contained contraband, let
alone the only persons identified to live at the corrected address, the Greens. Any
person who answered the door and received the package would subject the
residence to search including individuals who were not named in any part of the
affidavit as being persons suspected of drug use or dealings.
Appellant asserts that the very reason for requiring some evidence of
probable cause is to avoid such situations. The warrant in this case was not
supported by probable cause sufficient to justify violating Appellant's right to be
freefromunreasonable search and seizure and the evidence resultingfromsearch
based upon said warrant should have been suppressed. Further, thefindingsset
forth by the magistrate in the search warrant as to paragraphs 3 and 4 are clearly
erroneous, in that the information in the affidavit clearly indicated to the contrary.
10

There were no findings made to support the authorization of the search following the
delivery, to wit: that the persons at the residence were the persons to whom the
package was addressed; or that the persons at the residence had any knowledge that
the package contained contraband and were involved in criminal activity.
POINT II
THE ISSUANCE OF AN "ANTICIPATORY" SEARCH WARRANT
VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-202
AND ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
The search warrant issued for the search of Appellant's residence in this case
was an "anticipatory" warrant. An anticipatory warrant is one which authorizes a
search in anticipation of an event taking place. In this case, that event was the
delivery of the package to the address on the package. There is a split of opinion on
the issue of the legality of anticipatory warrants by Courts which have addressed
that issue. Utah has yet to address the legality of such warrants. Appellant suggests
that Utah should adopt the position taken by those states which do not uphold
anticipatory warrants. The states which have failed to recognize anticipatory
warrants have statutory provisions regarding search warrants that are similar to that
of Utah.
The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Berge, 634 P.2d 947 (1981), was
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faced with a fact situation which closely resembles that of the present case. The law
enforcement officers received information that a certain individual was receiving
contraband through the mail. Based upon the information from the informant and
the fact that a trained dog alerted to a postal package addressed to the defendant, the
officers obtained a warrant for the search of the package which had arrived at the
local UPS terminal. The package was found to contain contraband. The officers
then obtained a second search warrant to search the person and residence of the
person to whom the package was addressed. The officers re-wrapped the package
and arranged to have it delivered by a police officer in a UPS truck and uniform.
The defendant accepted the package and took it into his residence, but before the
police could execute the warrant, he left in his car. The officers could not locate
him and went ahead and executed the search warrantfindingthe package and other
contraband in the defendant's residence. The Arizona Court stated at 634 P.2d 948:
"A search warrant may not be issued unless the issuing magistrate has probable
cause to believe that a crime was committed or is in the process of being
committed." The Court found that the package in that case, as in the present case,
was in the possession of the police at the time the magistrate issued the search
warrant and therefore no crime was being committed. What the defendant did with
the package would determine whether or not he had committed a crime. The Court
12

held that it was not reasonable to issue a warrant upon future acts that "can only
come into being by actions of the persons seeking the warrant." 634 P.2d at 949.
Additionally, in People v. Ross, 659 N.E.2d 1319 (111.1995), UPS accidently
opened a letter which was found to contain cocaine. The UPS employees contacted
law enforcement officers who confirmed the presence of cocaine. The officers then
made arrangements to have UPS deliver the letter to the addressee, the defendant.
Prior to the delivery of the letter, and prior to the commission of a crime by the
defendant, the officers obtained a warrant for the search of the defendant's
residence once the package had been delivered. UPS delivered the package and
five (5) minutes later the officers executed the search warrant. The Illinois Court
was presented with the same issue which is present in this case. Did the statutes
and constitution of Illinois allow the issuance of anticipatory search warrants?
The Illinois statute controlling the case, Section 108-3 of the Illinois Code of
Criminal Procedure provides:
(a)...upon the written complaint of any person under oath or affirmation which
states facts sufficient to show probable cause and which particularly describes
the place or person, or both, to be searched and the things to be seized, any
judge may issue a search warrant for the seizure of the following: (1) Any
instruments, articles, or things which have been used in the commission of, or
which may constitute evidence of, the offense in connection with which the
warrant is issued.
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The Illinois Court interpreted the foregoing provision to prohibit the issuance of
anticipatory warrants.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-202, contains a similar requirement that the property
sought to be seized must have been used or probable cause must be for crimes
which have been or are being committed at the time of the issuance of the warrant.
The Utah statute provides:
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search warrant if there is
probable cause to believe it:
(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(2) has been used or is being possessed for the purpose of being used to
commit or conceal the commission of an offense; or
(3) is evidence of illegal conduct.

The language in the Utah statute clearly restricts the issuance of a search warrant to
those situations where some crime has been, or is being committed. The language is
in the present or the past tense, i.e., was unlawfully acquired; is unlawfully
possessed; has been used; or is being used; or is evidence of illegal conduct.
Nothing in the section provides any authority to allow issuance of a search warrant
based upon anticipated future conduct of the law enforcement officers, for future
anticipated illegal conduct or things which may be used in the future for illegal
purposes.
At the time of the issuance of the warrant, no crime was being committed by
14

Appellant, nor was any such crime alleged to have been committed by the affidavit
in support of the warrant. The evidence sought to be seized, to wit: the UPS
package, was already in the possession of the police. No crime in regard to that
contraband could be committed by Appellant until the officers introduced the item to
be seized into the possession of Appellant through the UPS employees who were
acting in concert and at the direction of the officers.
In yet another similar factual situation under a similar statutory provision, the
Supreme Court of Colorado in People v. Poirez, 904 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1995) reached
the same conclusion as to the legality of anticipatory search warrants. In that case,
UPS also discovered a package which contained contraband and reported it to the
authorities. The package was turned over to the Vail, Colorado, police. The police
agency investigated the address and the addressee, finding no record of the
addressee at the address listed. The officers obtained a warrant to search the
premises which was conditioned upon two facts: (1) A task force agent will deliver
the package to the residence to be searched. (2) Someone from inside the residence
will accept the package and take it inside. The package was delivered to the
address and upon delivery a person took the package into the residence. With the
door still open the person who had accepted the package called for the person to
whom the package was addressed, whereupon the defendant appeared and took the
15

package. The defendant was immediately arrested. The Colorado Court held that
the use by the legislature of the present tense language required the evidence to be
located on the premises at the time the warrant was issued. The Court determined
that the warrant was an anticipatory warrant and therefore unlawful since the
evidence was not present at the premises until after the officers had taken it there.
The Court in Poirez, acknowledged that the majority of federal Courts have
upheld anticipatory warrants. The Court indicated that the reason some federal
Courts are recognizing anticipatory warrants is a result of a change to the provisions
of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which was made in 1990.
Prior to the change, the rule contained the term "is located" in allowing the issuance
of a search warrant for contraband or other evidence. The 1990 change removed
that term from the rule. The Colorado Court cited the 1990 advisory committee
note as follows:
Rule 41(a)(1) permits anticipatory warrants by omitting the words "is
located," which in the past required that in all instances the object of the
search had to be located within the district at the time the warrant was issued.
Now a search for property or a person within the district, or expected to be
within the district, is valid if it otherwise complies with this rule. 904 P.2d at
883.
Since Colorado's statute contained language which required the magistrate to find
probable cause that the property to be searched for be "located at, in, or upon the
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premises, person, place or thing to be searched", the use of the present tense
prohibited the search for property that was anticipated to be at a certain place. 904
P.2d at 882.
Utah's law has not been changed or altered to allow anticipatory warrants.
Until the legislature deems it advisable to amend to allow such change, Utah's
statute remains a bar to anticipatory warrants.
The allowance of anticipatory warrants creates a great risk of intrusion by law
enforcement officers into the residences of innocent citizens if a warrant may be
based upon the facts set forth in the probable cause statement submitted to the
magistrate in the present case and upon some future acts. There was no evidence
presented to the magistrate to provide probable cause that to show that the only
identified residents of the premises sought to be searched were connected with the
sender of the package or the addressee. Had one of those individuals been at home
and accepted delivery of the package, the search would have ensued under the
provisions of the warrant, whether or not the person to whom the package was
addressed was present or not. The authority of the warrant did not restrict delivery
of the package to someone identified as Roy Womack, but allowed the officers to
search upon any person accepting the package.

17

CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the search warrant issued in this case should have
been suppressed by the trial Court and that the failure to do so constituted reversible
error. The affidavit did not contain sufficient probable cause to establish that the
contraband sought to be seized was presently in the location sought to be searched.
Further, the allowance of the procedure used in this case would allow a person who
had some reason to incriminate another to set up the other by mailing a package
containing contraband to the other and then inform the police that a package with
contraband was to be delivered. The provisions of the warrant were not supported
by probable cause, nor were the findings of probable cause set forth in the warrant
true. The property described was not located at the premises sought to be searched
nor was the person or entity in possession of the property a party to the alleged
illegal conduct. The persons in possession of the property at that time were the law
enforcement officers.
Anticipatory search warrants are not authorized by Utah statute or
constitutional provision. No warrant shall issue except upon probable cause. The
right of citizens to befreefromunreasonable search cannot be violated by allowing
search warrants to issue upon conditions which may or may not exist in the future
and which are based upon unknown future acts of officers or others. For the
18

reasons set forth above, Appellant submits the trial Court committed error by
refusing to suppress the evidence obtained by the search in this case and Appellant's
conviction should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of March, 1998.
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

MICHAEL B^ESPEtN
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
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ADDENDUM
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 14
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii)
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-37-8(4) (a)
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-23-202
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
Addendum "A",

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of the Court
Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress

Addendum "B",

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress

Addendum "C",

Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant

Addendum "D",

Search Warrant
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Art. I, § 9

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail.
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law.
1988 (2nd S.S.)
[ E x c e s s i v e b a i l a n d fines — C r u e l p u n i s h ments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
1896

582

S e c . 14.

[ U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s forbidden — Issua n c e of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no w a r r a n t shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized.
1896

Sec. 9.

S e c . 10. [Trial b y j u r y . ]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
1996
S e c . 11. [Courts o p e n — R e d r e s s of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party.

1896

S e c . 12. [Rights of a c c u s e d p e r s o n s . ]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
n a t u r e and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of t h a t examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in p a r t at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by s t a t u t e or rule.
1994
S e c . 13.

[ P r o s e c u t i o n by i n f o r m a t i o n or i n d i c t m e n t —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947

S e c . 15. [ F r e e d o m of s p e e c h a n d of t h e p r e s s — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
t r u t h may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury t h a t the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact.
1896
S e c . 16. [No i m p r i s o n m e n t for d e b t — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors.
1896
S e c . 17. [ E l e c t i o n s to b e free — S o l d i e r s voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 18.

[Attainder — Ex post facto l a w s — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896
S e c . 19. [Treason d e n n e d — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
1896
Sec. 20. [Military s u b o r d i n a t e to t h e civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of t h e owner; nor in time of war
except in a m a n n e r to be prescribed by law.
1896
S e c . 2 1 . [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
1896
S e c . 22. [ P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y for p u b l i c use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without j u s t compensation.
1896
S e c . 23. [Irrevocable f r a n c h i s e s forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity.
1896
S e c . 24. [Uniform o p e r a t i o n of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
1896

S e c . 25. [Rights r e t a i n e d by p e o p l e . ]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
or deny others retained by the people.
1896
Sec. 26. [ P r o v i s i o n s m a n d a t o r y a n d prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
otherwise.
1896

Art. IV, § 4

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT I

[ R e l i g i o u s a n d p o l i t i c a l freedom.]
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment <?/*
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
AMENDMENT II
[ R i g h t to b e a r a r m s . ]
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.
AMENDMENT III
[Quartering soldiers.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any h o u s ^
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
[ U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s . ]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, h o u s e ^
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal a c t i o n s — P r o v i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g — D u e proc e s s of l a w a n d j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval force^
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War Or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall h e
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public u s ^
without j u s t compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of a c c u s e d . ]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of t h e
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; tt>
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favoi-t
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VTI
[Trial by j u r y in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall bfe
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
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A M E N D M E N T VIII
[Bail — P u n i s h m e n t . ]
Excessive ball shall not he required, nor excessive dn^
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
A M E N D M E N T EX
[Rights r e t a i n e d by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by tta
people.
AMENDMENT X
[ P o w e r s r e s e r v e d t o s t a t e s or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by th e
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved tn
the States respectively, or to the people.
A M E N D M E N T XI
[Suits a g a i n s t s t a t e s — R e s t r i c t i o n of judicial power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be cot*,
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign Stat$.
AMENDMENT XII
[Election of P r e s i d e n t a n d Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vot^
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state wit^
themselves; they shall n a m e in their ballots the person votetf
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for a$
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all per.
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for a$
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which list$
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of
the Government of the United States, directed to the PresL
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in ih%
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—Th$
person having the greatest number of votes for President,
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of th$ *
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person hav$
such majority, then from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for a*
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immedi*
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President,
the votes shall be t a k e n by states, the representation from
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states,
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose %
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upot^
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The
person having the greatest number of votes as "Vice-President^
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for th$
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall w
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligi"»e
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of VicePresident of the United States.
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section (8). Each separate violation of this subsection is a
third degree felony and is also subject to a civil penalty
not to exceed $5,000.
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section £8-1108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the division.
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection £hall
be deposited in the General Fund.
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit
information to the database as required under this section
after the division has submitted a specific written r e q u e s t
for the information or when the division determined the
individual has a demonstrable pattern of failing to submit
the information as required is grounds for the division to
take the following actions in accordance with Section
58-1-401:
(i) refuse to issue a license to the individual;
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license;
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation
the license;
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the
individual;
(v) issue a cease and desist order; and
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the
required information is not submitted.
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (#)(vi)
shall be deposited in the General Fund.
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 08-1108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the division.
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the
database in accordance with this section may not be held
civilly liable for having submitted the information.
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to
establish and operate the database shall be funded by
appropriations from the General Fund.
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated without the use of any resources within the Commerce Service
Fund.
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the
submitting drug outlet.
1996
58-37-8. P r o h i b i t e d a c t s — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to po5sess
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance
with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages
in conduct which results in any violation of any
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c,
or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing
series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate
occasions that are undertaken in concert w i t h
five or more persons with respect to whom the
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person occupies a position of organizer, surwr*
sor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (iv
with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or l\ 0r
controlled substance analog is guilty of a secPn
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent rtjr
viction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV c
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upoa second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a secon'
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guiltyc
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subst
quent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsectio:
(l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable bimprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less thai
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition oj
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally tc
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, diredlj
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by
this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or persofl in
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat,
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to
permit t h e m to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess an altered or forged prescription or written
order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or njorc,
is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, fl*3*1*
j u a n a , if the a m o u n t is more than 16 ounces, but less
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog*u
guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the (°m
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, «»
the amount is more t h a n one ounce but less thafl 16
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of p r o p ^
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confined61"
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
provided in Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of poises*
sion of any controlled substance by a person, that pe1^011
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with
respect to all other controlled substances not included lfl
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than on£
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdeme^110*
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a cl^ ss
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent convict*011
the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating S u b s e t
(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
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(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A
misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a
third degree felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or
distribution of a controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a
false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die,
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint,
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or
container or labeling so as to render any drug a
counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a)
is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a
person not authorized under this chapter who commits
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and
classifications under Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary
school or on the grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or
post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of
those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored
by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care
facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or
recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium,
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot
or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
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(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through
(viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age,
regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of
a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of
not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would
have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been
established would have been less than a first degree
felony but for this subsection, a person convicted under
this subsection is guilty of one degree more than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this
subsection that the actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a)
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred
was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is
specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction guilty
of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for
that offense.
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal
under federal law or the law of another state for the same
act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(8) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or persons produced,
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character
of the substance or substances.
(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not
for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction
and supervision.
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under
this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in
the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and
legitimate scope of his employment.
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid,
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
1997
58-37-8.5.

Applicability of Title 76 p r o s e c u t i o n s u n d e r
this chapter.
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the
provisions of this chapter, the provisions of Title 76, Chapters
1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this
chapter.
1997
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(iv) minimizes the degree of discretion to be exercised by the individual enforcement officers operating
the checkpoint; and
(v) maximizes the safety of the motorist and the
enforcement officers.
(3) Upon determination by the magistrate that the plan
meets the requirements of Subsection (2}(b), the magistrate
shall sign the authorization and issue it to the command level
officer, retaining a copy for the court's file.
(4) A copy of the plan and signed authorization shall be
issued to the checkpoint command level officer participating in
the operation of the checkpoint.
(5) Any enforcement officer participating in the operation of
the checkpoint shall conform his activities as nearly as practicable to the procedures outlined in the plan.
(6) The checkpoint command level officer shall be available
to exhibit a copy of the plan and signed authorization to any
motorist who has been stopped at the checkpoint upon request
of the motorist.
1997
77-23-105. F a i l u r e to s t o p — C r i m i n a l liability.
Any person who intentionally and knowingly passes, without stopping as required, any administrative traffic checkpoint operated under the authority of a magistrate as provided
in Section 77-23-104 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1992
PART 2
S E A R C H WARRANTS
77-23-201. " S e a r c h w a r r a n t " defined.
A search w a r r a n t is an order issued by a magistrate in the
name of the state and directed to a peace officer, describing
with particularity the thing, place, or person to be searched
and the property or evidence to be seized by him and brought
before the magistrate.
1994
77-23-202. G r o u n d s for i s s u a n c e .
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search
w a r r a n t if there is probable cause to believe it:
(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an
offense; or
(3) is evidence of illegal conduct.
1994
77-23-203. C o n d i t i o n s p r e c e d e n t to i s s u a n c e .
(1) A search w a r r a n t shall not issue except upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing
the person or place to be searched and the person, property, or
evidence to be seized.
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal
conduct, and is in the possession of a person or entity for which
there is insufficient probable cause shown to the magistrate to
believe t h a t such person or entity is a party to the alleged
illegal conduct, no search w a r r a n t shall issue except upon a
finding by the magistrate t h a t the evidence sought to be seized
cannot be obtained by subpoena, or that such evidence would
be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if sought by
subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such
conditions t h a t reasonably afford protection of the following
interests of the person or entity in possession of such evidence:
(a) protection against unreasonable interference with
normal business;
(b) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected
confidential sources of information; or
(c) protection against prior or direct restraints on constitutionally protected rights.
1994

77-23-206

77-23-204.

E x a m i n a t i o n of c o m p l a i n a n t a n d w i t n e s s e s
— W i t n e s s n o t i n p h y s i c a l p r e s e n c e of m a g i s t r a t e — Duplicate original w a r r a n t s — Return.
(1) All evidence to be considered by a magistrate in the
issuance of a search w a r r a n t shall be given on oath and either
reduced to writing or recorded verbatim. Transcription of the
recorded testimony need not precede the issuance of the
warrant. Any person having standing to contest the search
may request and shall be provided with a transcription of the
recorded testimony in support of the application for the
warrant.
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in
the absence of an affidavit, a search warrant may be issued
upon sworn oral testimony of a person who is not in the
physical presence of the magistrate, provided the magistrate
is satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the
warrant. The sworn oral testimony may be communicated to
the magistrate by telephone or other appropriate means and
shall be recorded and transcribed. After transcription, the
statement shall be certified by the magistrate and filed with
the court. This statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for
purposes of this section.
(a) The grounds for issuance and contents of the warr a n t issued p u r s u a n t to Subsection (2) shall be those
required by this chapter. Prior to issuance of the w a r r a n t ,
the magistrate shall require the law enforcement officer
or the prosecuting attorney who is requesting the w a r r a n t
to read to him verbatim the contents of the warrant. The
magistrate may direct that specific modifications be made
in the warrant. Upon approval, the magistrate shall
direct the law enforcement officer or the prosecuting
attorney for the government who is requesting the warr a n t to sign the magistrate's name on the warrant. This
w a r r a n t shall be called a duplicate original w a r r a n t and
shall be deemed a w a r r a n t for purposes of this chapter. In
these cases the magistrate shall cause to be made an
original warrant. The magistrate shall enter the exact
time of issuance of the duplicate original w a r r a n t on the
face of the original w a r r a n t .
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and the
original w a r r a n t shall be in conformity with this chapter,
Upon return, the magistrate shall require the person who
gave the sworn oral testimony establishing the grounds
for issuance of the w a r r a n t to sign a copy of the transcript,
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate shall issue a.
search warrant.
1994
77-23-205.

T i m e for s e r v i c e — Officer m a y r e q u e s t as*
sistance.
(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the w a r r a n t
that it be served in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral
testimony state a reasonable cause to believe a search is
necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good
reason; in which case he may insert a direction t h a t it be
served any time of the day or night. An officer may request
other persons to assist him in conducting the search.
(2) The search w a r r a n t shall be served within ten days from
the date of issuance. Any search warrant not executed within
this time shall be void and shall be returned to the court or
magistrate as not executed.
1994
77-23-206. R e c e i p t for p r o p e r t y t a k e n .
When the officer seizes property pursuant to a search
warrant, he shall give a receipt to the person from whom it
was seized or in whose possession it was found. If no person ie>
present, the officer shall leave the receipt in the place where
he found the property Failure to give or leave a receipt shall
not render the evidence seized inadmissible at trial.
1994

407

78-3-4

JUDICIAL CODE

(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels,
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court,
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals, and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and the Judicial Council
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court
1988

78-2a-5. L o c a t i o n of C o u r t of A p p e a l s .
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake
City The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in
any location within the state
1986
CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3 1 to 78 3-2 Repealed
78-3 3
Term of judges — Vacancy
78-3-4
Jurisdiction — Appeals
78-3-5
Repealed
78-3-6
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly
78-3-7 to 78-3-11 Repealed
78-3-11 5
State District Court Administrative System
78-3-12
Repealed
78-3-12 5
Costs of system
78-3-13
Repealed
78-3-13 4
Transfer of court operating responsibilities —
Facilities — Staff— Budget
78-3-13 5, 78-3-14 Repealed
78-3-14 2
District court case management
78-3-14 5
Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures
78-3-15 to 78-3-17 Repealed
78-3-17 5
Application of savings accruing to counties
78-3-18
Judicial Administration Act — Short title
78-3-19
Purpose of act
78-3-20
Definitions
78-3-21
Judicial Council — Creation — Members —
Terms and election — Responsibilities —
Reports
78-3-21 5
Data bases for judicial boards
78-3-22
Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties
78-3-23
Administrator of the courts — Appointment —
Qualifications — Salary
78-3-24
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and
responsibilities
78-3-25
Assistants for administrator of the courts —
Appointment of trial court executives
78-3-26
Courts to provide information and statistical
data to administrator of the courts
78-3-27
Annual judicial conference
78-3-28
Repealed
78-3-29
Presiding judge —Associate presiding judge —
Election — Term — Compensation — Powers
— Duties
78-3-30
Duties of the clerk of the district court
78-3-31
Court commissioners — Qualifications — Appointment — Functions governed by rule

78-2a-3. C o u r t of A p p e a l s j u r i s d i c t i o n .
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees, or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
(b) appeals from the district court review of
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12 1,
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts,
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony,
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony,
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony,
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony,
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation,
adoption, and paternity,
d) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
Court for original appellate review and determination any
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply \\ ith the require
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings
1996

78-3-3. Term of j u d g e s — Vacancy.
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment Thereafter, the
term of office forjudges of the district courts is six years, and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified
1988

78-2a-4. R e v i e w of a c t i o n s b y S u p r e m e Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court
1986

78-3-4. J u r i s d i c t i o n — A p p e a l s .
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and
not prohibited by law

78-3-1 to 78-3-2.

Repealed.

1971, 1981, 1988

ADDENDUM "A

KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
CURTIS L. LARSON #6598
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, UT 84606
(801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH -- OREM MUNICIPAL DIVISION
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROY CLINTON WOMACK II

Case No. 961000485

Defendant(s).

JUDGE JOHN C. BACKLUND

This matter came before the Court on February 26, 199 7, the
Honorable

John

C.

Backlund

presiding,

for

Defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

oral

arguments

on

Defendant submitted to

the Court a written memorandum in support of the motion. Plaintiff
submitted a written response in opposition thereto. Both memoranda
proffered the factual basis controlling this matter, and appropriate arguments on the issues of law.

These memoranda had been

previously received by the Court, and form part of the Court's
record.
At the argument hearing, Defendant was represented by Mr.
Michael Esplin, Esq..

The Plaintiff was represented by Mr. Curtis

L. Larson, Deputy Utah County Attorney.

Parties stipulated to

submission

of

the matter

for decision based upon

the written

memoranda before the Court, The facts, as contained in Defendant's
memorandum, were generally stipulated

to by the parties, with

Plaintiff requesting the Court take notice of certain additions or
clarifications

proffered

in

Plaintiff's

response

memorandum.

Defendant did not object to the Court accepting these additions and
clarifications as relevant parts of the facts controlling this
matter.

Based

upon

the stipulation

of

the parties, no

oral

argument was made to the Court.
NOW THE COURT, having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the
parties, and being fully apprised in the premises, hereby makes and
enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That on February 21, 1996, agents of the United Parcel

Service ("UPS") attempted to deliver a package addressed to a Roy
Womack at the address of 120 West 1200 North, Orem, Utah.

It was

discovered that the address did not exist.
2.

That

the package was sent

from the address

of

3002

Honolulu Avenue #18, La Cresenta, California, 91214, by an Eileen
0'Hara.
3.

That UPS agents looked in the local telephone directory

and located a family named Womack living at 233 East 1000 South,
2

Orem, Utah, and this family being the only Womack family in the
directory, delivered the package to that family, at that address.
4.

That the Womack family living at 233 East 1000 South,

Orem, Utah, opened the package believing in good faith that the
package was for them.
5.

That after the Womack family opened the package they

discovered that it was not for them, and that it also might contain
a controlled substance, namely, marijuana.
6.
Department

That Mrs. Womack took the package to the Orem City Police
and

turned

it, and

its

contents,

over

to

police

officials.
7.
substance

That once in the possession of police officials, the
in

the

package

was

determined

to

be

marijuana,

a

controlled substance, and weighed twenty-eight (28) grams.
8.

That on February 27, 1996, the Womack family living at

233 East 1000 South, Orem, Utah, had a male visitor at their home.
This male individual stated that he was "Roy Womack, " and asked
about the package.

The male was told that the package was not

there.
9.

That in the evening of February 27, 1996, the Womack

family residing at 233 East 1000 South, Orem, Utah, received a
telephone call from an female who identified herself as "Eileen

3

O'Hara" and asked about the package.

She was also told that the

package was not there.
10.

That on February 27, 1996, the package's sender, Eileen

O'Hara, made contact with UPS and requested the package be located,
and delivered to a corrected address, that being, 127 West 1200
North, Orem, Utah.
11.

That

Eileen

O'Hara

did

not

change

the

name

of

the

addressee (Roy Womack) , only the address to which the package was
to be delivered.
12.

That on February 28, 1996, a UPS agent contacted Eileen

O'Hara by telephone and indicated to her that the package would be
delivered this date to the corrected address between 12:00 P.M. and
3:00

P.M.,

present,

and that the addressee would have to be personally

as

delivery.

his

signature would be required

on a

receipt

of

Eileen O'Hara assured the UPS agent that the addressee,

Roy Womack, would be present at the residence during that time, and
that she would "page" the addressee.
13.
Police

That on February 28, 199 6, Sgt. Jerry Harper, Provo City
Department,

assigned

to

the

Utah

County

Narcotics

Enforcement Task Force ("NET"), presented an affidavit in support
of a search warrant to Judge Guy R. Burningham, Fourth District
Court, State of Utah, seeking the issuance of a search warrant for
the residence located at the corrected address of 127 West 1200
4

North,

Orem,

Utah,

as

NET

officers

would

be

performing

a

"controlled delivery" of the package to the address, and then after
delivery desired to search the residence for the package and any
other

controlled

substance,

and

associated

drug

related

paraphernalia.
14.

That upon reviewing the affidavit, Judge Burningham found

probable cause to issue the search warrant, and did so, issuing it
February 28, 1996 at 11:40 A.M.

This search warrant was a "no-

knock, " "daytime only" search warrant, which could only be validly
executed after delivery of the package to the residence.
15.

That on February 28, 1996, Sgt Harper went with a UPS

agent to deliver the package to the addressee, Roy Womack, at 127
West 1200 North, Orem, Utah. The package remained in Sgt. Harper's
control until reaching the residence address. The package was then
given to the UPS agent while both men were in the UPS delivery
truck's package/cargo area.
16.

That the UPS agent took the package to the residence's

front door, and after announcing his presence, was met by a male
individual at the door.
agent as Roy Womack.

The male identified himself to the UPS

The male individual signed the UPS receipt of

delivery with the name Roy Womack.
agent with the addressee.

The package was left by the UPS

After delivery, the UPS agent returned

to the delivery truck and advised Sgt. Harper that the package had
5

been delivered to a male, wearing a white T-shirt and glasses, who
identified himself as Roy Womack, both orally and in written form
on the receipt.
17.

That upon receiving information the package had been

received by the addressee Roy Womack at the residence, NET officers
waited a period of ten (10) minutes.
18.

That after waiting that period, NET officers converged on

the residence, executing the search warrant.
19.

That the male who received the package from the UPS agent

was the sole person found in the residence at the time the search
warrant was executed, and was found in the basement area of the
residence.

That the male was identified as the Defendant, Roy

Clinton Womack II.
20.

That as a result of the search, the package was found,

opened, in the Defendant's bedroom, the marijuana having been
removed.
21.

That the bag containing the delivered marijuana was

located in the Defendant's bedroom closet, with the marijuana still
enclosed.
22.

That other items of drug related paraphernalia were also

located in the Defendant's bedroom.

6

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
the

That the affidavit by Sgt. Jerry Harper, in support of

issuance

information

of

the

search

warrant,

supplied

the

requisite

regarding the proximity in time of events and

the

location to be searched to form probable cause for the issuance of
the search warrant for the residence.
2.

That the affidavit by Sgt. Jerry Harper sufficiently set

forth information with which the magistrate was made aware: (1) of
the factual circumstances surrounding the police's interception of
the package containing the controlled substance; (2) that the package, and controlled substance was then in possession of the police;
(3) that the package's sender (Eileen O'Hara) and addressee (Roy
Womack) were yet seeking its delivery to the addressee at the
location officers were seeking the search warrant for; (4) that the
officers were desiring to perform a "controlled delivery" of the
package, and the controlled substance, to the named addressee at
the residence described in the affidavit; (5) that the controlled
delivery would take place in the immediate future; and (6) that the
officers desired to search the residence only after delivery of the
package and controlled substance.
3.

That

the

search

warrant

issued

by

Judge

Guy

R.

Burningham, Fourth District Court, State of Utah, on February 28,
199 7, was validly

issued by a neutral magistrate, based
7

upon

probable cause, being supported by the affidavit of Sgt. Jerry
Harper.
4.

That

the

search

warrant

particularly

described

the

location to be searched.
5.

That the search warrant particularly described the things

to be seized; which included the delivered package and controlled
substance it contained, and also other items which are controlled
substances, and associated drug related paraphernalia.
6.

That

the

search

warrant

did

not

contain

false

or

misleading statements which would render it invalid on its face.
7.
discretion

That

the

search warrant

of

the

officers

in

sufficiently

its

execution

restricted
by

the

specifically

limiting the time of execution to after the package and controlled
substance were delivered and received at the residence.
8.

That

the

issuance

of

the

search

warrant,

though

"anticipatory" in nature, did not offend or violate statutory law
regarding the grounds for the issuance of a search warrant, as
found in section 77-23-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended
(UCA); the Court finding specifically that section 77-23-202(3),
UCA, applies

to this matter.

The Court holds that the plain

reading this section's language does not place a restriction upon
where the evidence of illegal conduct is located at the time the
search warrant is issued, only that the material sought for seizure
8

must

be

evidence

of

illegal

activity.

Therefore,

the

Court

concludes that under section 77-23-202(3), UCA, the issuance of the
search

warrant

for

the

residence

was valid,

even

though

the

evidence of illegal conduct was in the physical possession of the
police and not at the location for which the search warrant was
sought, at the time the search warrant was sought by Sgt. Harper,
and issued by Judge Burningham.
9.

That

the

issuance

of

the

search

warrant,

though

"anticipa'tory" in nature did not violate provisions of Article I,
Section 14, of the Constitution of Utah, nor the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States.

The Court is persuaded

by, and fully adopts as controlling in this action, the case law
decisions of sister states' courts, and decisions rendered in the
federal

courts, as propounded by the state, which uphold

constitutionality of "anticipatory search warrants."
Court

finds

the

Further, the

their direction instructive, when applied

to this

matter, as further basis for upholding the validity of the search
warrant issued in this action.
Specifically, in

McNeill

v Commonwealth,

395 SE2d 460, (Va

App 1990) , the court, directed that the contraband should be on a
sure course to it destination; and, that there must be probable
cause to believe that the items to be seized will be at the place
to be searched at the time the warrant is executed.
9

The Court

concludes that in this matter the package, and controlled substance
it contained, were on a sure course
the probable

cause

to its

destination,

requirement was met as

and that

the magistrate

was

informed, via the affidavit, that the controlled substance would be
on the premises at the time the warrant was executed.
In State

v Wine,

787 SW2d 31, (Tenn Crim App 1989) , the court

upheld an anticipatory warrant, and directed that the affidavit
should inform the magistrate that the known or suspected contraband
will be delivered in the immediate future and the basis of the
affiant's knowledge that the item will be delivered, and that the
warrant explicitly condition its execution upon the occurrence of
a specified event.

The Court concludes that the affidavit set

forth that the package was to be delivered in the immediate future,
and the affiant's knowledge that the package would be delivered.
Additionally, the warrant clearly expressed that the warrant could
not be validly executed until after the package's delivery.
Similarly, in State

v Engel,

465 NW2d 787, (SD 1991) , the

court directed that the warrant should be specific in limiting the
conditions that govern the warrant's execution.

The Court con-

cludes in this case, that the magistrate explicitly limited the
discretion of the officers in when to execute the warrant, by
including in it the command that the search occur only after the
package's delivery.
10

10.
faith"

That the Court concludes the officers acted in "good

on

the

issued

decisions in United
Horton,

search

States

warrant, as per

v Leon,

appellate

court

468 US 897 (1984) , and State

v.

848 P2d 708 (Utah App 1993), and specifically that: (1) the

issuing magistrate was not misled by information in the affidavit
that affiant knew was false or would have known was false except
for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) the issuing magistrate
did not wholly abandon his judicial role and fail to perform his
neutral and detached function; (3) the warrant was not based on an
affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) the
warrant was not so facially deficient that it failed to particularize the place to be search or the things to be seized, so the executing officers could not presume it to be valid.
11.

That based upon the foregoing, the Defendant's motion to

suppress evidence seized as a result of the search of the residence
should be denied.
ORDER
THE COURT, having entered appropriate findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and being fully apprised on the premises, now
enters the following Order:
BE IT HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED:

11

1.

That Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a

result of the search of the residence is DENIED.

DATED this

day of

, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

JOHN C. BACKLUND
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM "B

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Defendant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box L
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Telephone: (801) 373-4912
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
Memorandum In Support of Motion to
Suppress

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

:

ROY WOMACK

:

Case No.961000485

Judge John C. Backlund
Defendant.

:

COMES NOW the defendant and submits this memorandum in support of his
Motion to Suppress Evidence previously filed herein.
FACTS
1

On February 21, 1996, UPS attempted to deliver a package addressed Roy
Womack at 120 West 1200 North in Orem, Utah.

The address was not a valid

address so the UPS employees searched the telephone book and found a Womack
family living in Orem and delivered the package to that family, although the listing
was not for a Roy Womack. The package had a return address identified to Eileen
O'Hara in California. Although there were no Roy Womacks at the residence to
which the package was delivered, the occupants opened the package and looked
through its contents discovering some marijuana. The Womacks then took the
package to the Orem City Police station and turned it over to the officers.
Six days later, the UPS office received a call from a person who identified
herself as Eileen O'Hara who, upon being told that the package had been delivered
to the wrong address, told the UPS workers to deliver the package to 127 West
1200 N., Orem, Utah. After the package had been turned over to the police, an
individual who claimed to be Roy Womack contacted the Womacks who had
received the package and was told the package was not there.
The Orem police determined that the new address was a good address and
2

that the people living at the address were John and Kathleen Green. There was no
record of a Roy Womack or any Womack living at the address. The law
enforcement officers, while still in possession of the package, sought permission of
the court to conduct a controlled delivery of the package and to conduct a search of
the premises for additional evidence including "evidence of possession of the home
and a nexus to the evidence." A warrant was issued which granted the request
dated the 28lh day of February, 1996. That same day, the officers gave the package
to UPS employees and then followed the employees to the address and waited while
the package was delivered by UPS. The officers then kicked in the door and
entered the residence, locating the defendant in the residence in possession of the
marijuana, having opened the package.
ARGUMENT
Defendant challenges the search upon two grounds. First, there was not
sufficient probable cause to believe that the person to whom the package was
addressed lived at the residence, and if so, if he had access to the whole of the
home, rented just one room or exactly what the living arrangement was. In fact, the
3

officers information did not state any probable cause to indicate that Womack lived
at that location. The only evidence was that the address (which had already been
erroneously written on the package), was supplied by the sender of the package.
The police conducted no surveilance to verify that Roy Womack lived at the address
prior to applying for the search warrant. The evidence which they set forth in the
affidavit was that the Greens lived there. There was no evidence that there was any
drug activity associated with the home or the occupants preceding the delivery of
the package. In short, the affidavit failed to set forth any probable cause upon
which a magistrate might rely in regard to the assertion that there were drugs on the
premises at the time the affidavit was presented to the magistrate.

At that time

there was no information upon which the magistrate could rely to upon the question
of contraband being in the residence sought to be searched since it was still in the
possession of the police. The search warrant issued falsely sets forth in paragraph
2, that the property sought to be seized "is most probably located at the premises
also set forth below". Once the warrant issued, the police did not need to wait until
they had the package delivered as the search warrant gave them authority to search
4

the residence at anytime within ten days of its issuance. In the event no one had
answered the door, the officers, under this warrant could have gone in and searched
the home pursuant to the warrant since the warrant authorized immediate search for
"controlled substances, together with associated paraphernalia, including items
capable of being used for the storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana
and other controlled substances, evidence that shows possession of the home and a
nexus to the evidence, as well as the UPS package that is delivered and its
contents." The warrant which authorizes such a broad area of search without
supporting probable cause constitutes unreasonable search under the provisions of
the statutes and Constitution of the State of Utah and the U.S. Constitution.
The second problem with the warrant in this case is that is it an "anticipatory
warrant" which authorizes a search in anticipation of an event taking place, to wit:
the delivery of the package by UPS. Although there is a split of opinion on the issue
of the legality of anticipatory warrants, Utah has yet to address the issue. Defendant
argues that Utah should take the position of the those states which do not uphold
anticipatory warrants.
5

The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Berge, 634 P.2d 947(1981), was
faced with a fact situation which closely resembles that of the present case. The
officers received infonnation that a certain individual was receiving contraband
tlirough the mail. Based upon the infonnation from the informant and the fact that a
trained dog alerted to a package addressed to the defendant, the officers obtained a
warrant for the search of a package which had arrived at the local UPS tenninal.
The package was found to contain contraband. The officers then obtained a second
search warrant to search the person and residence of the person to whom the
package was addressed. The officers re-wrapped and it was arranged to have the
package delivered by a police officer in a UPS truck and unifonn. The defendant
accepted delivery of the package and took it into his residence, but before the police
could execute the warrant, he left in his car. The officers could not locate him and
went ahead and executed the search wanant finding the package and other
contraband in the residence. The defendant returned during the search and was
placed under anest. The court stated at 634 P.2d 948, "A search wanant may not
be issued unless the issuing magistrate has probable cause to believe that a crime
6

was committed or is in the process of being committed." The court found that the
package in that case, as in the present case, was in the possession of the police at
the time the magistrate issued the warrant and therefore no crime was being
committed. What the defendant did with the package would determine whether or
not he had committed a crime. The court held that it was not reasonable to issue a
warrant upon future acts that "can only come into being by actions of the persons
seeking the warrant."634 P.2d at 949.
Also, in People v. Ross, 659 N.E.2d 1319 (111. 1995), UPS accidently opened
a letter which contained cocaine. They contacted law officers who confirmed the
presence of cocaine. They made arrangements to have UPS deliver the letter to the
addressee, the defendant. Prior to the delivery, and prior to the commission of a
crime by the defendant, the officers obtained a warrant which allowed the search of
the defendant's residence once the package had been delivered. UPS delivered the
letter and five minutes later the officers executed the search warrant. The issue
before the Illinois court was the same as the issue here. Did the Illinois statutes and
constitution allow the issuance of anticipatory warrants? The Illinois statute
7

controlling the case, Section 108-3 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure states:
(a)... upon the written complaint of any person under oath or affirmation
which states facts sufficient to show probable cause and which particularly
describes the place or person, or both, to be searched and the things to be
seized, any judge may issue a search warrant for the seizure of the following:
(1) Any instruments, articles or things which have been used in the
commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, the offense in
connection with which the warrant is issued.
In interpreting the foregoing provision to prohibit anticipatory warrants, the
court cited a number of Illinois cases to support its holding.
The defendant asserts that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 77-23202, contains a similar requirement that the property sought to be seized must have
been used or probable cause must be for crimes which have been or are being
committed at the time of the issuance of the warrant. The Utah section provides:
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant t a search warrant if there is
probable cause to believe it:
(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed;
(2) has been used or is being possessed for the purpose of being used to
commit or conceal the commission of an offense; or
(3) is evidence of illegal conduct.
It is clear from the language set forth above, that anticipatory warrants are not
8

authorized by the Utah statute. The language is in the present or past tense, i.e.,
was unlawfully acquired; is unlawfully possessed; has been used; or is being used;
or is evidence of illegal conduct. Nothing in the section provides any indication to
the effect anticipated conduct or things which may be used in the future for illegal
purposes are basis for issuance of the warrant.
In yet another similar fact and statutory situation, the Supreme Court of
Colorado in People v. Poirez, 904 P2d. 883 (Colo. 1995) reached the same
conclusion as to the legality of anticipatory search warrants. In that case, the UPS
again discovered a package which contained contraband and reported it to the
authorities. The package was turned over to the Vail police. The police agency
investigated the address and the addressee, finding no record of the addressee at the
address listed. The officers obtained a warrant to search the premises which was
conditioned upon two facts. (1) A task force agent will deliver the package to the
residence to be searched. (2) Someone from inside the residence will accept the
package and take it inside. The package was delivered to the address and upon
delivery a person took the package into the residence and with the door still open
9

called for the addressee whereupon the defendant appeared and took the package
and was arrested. The court held that the use by the legislature of the present tense
language required the evidence to be located at the premises to be searched at the
time the warrant was issued. The court determined that the warrant was an
anticipatory warrant and unlawful since the evidence was not present at the
premises until after taken there by the officers. Again, defendant submits that the
Utah statutes also require probable cause to be based upon information which
indicates a crime has occurred or is occurring in order to justify the issuance of a
search warrant.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendant submits that the court should suppress
any evidence obtained against the defendant as a result of the search warrant
executed in this case upon the grounds that there was no probable cause upon which
a magistrate could find probable cause that a crime had been committed or was
being committed and for the additional reason that the statutes and constitution of
Utah do not allow anticipatory warrants to allow premises to be searched upon the
10

possible occurance of an event. For those reasons and the case law set forth above,
defendant requests the order of this court suppressing the evidence illegally obtained
in this matter.
Dated this .^7/ "clay of January, 1996.

Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document to the
following:
CURTIS L. LARSON
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
this^Z—Tday of January, 1996.
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
A SEARCH WARRANT

-vsA MATTER OF A CRIMINAL
NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION
127 West 1200 N o r t h
Orem, U t a h

No.

DISCOVERY SENT TO
DEFENSE ATTGRNEV

Defendants

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

Criminal

: BS,
)

MAR l 5 %ft

Comes now Jerry Harper, having been duly sworn, who deposes
and states as follows:
1.

I am a sergeant with the Provo Police Department. I have been
a peace officer since 1979 when I graduated from POST as the
officer with the highest academic achievement in my class.
During the time I have been a peace officer I have received
over 225 hours of specialized training for law enforcement
work including 185 hours of training specific to narcotics
work.
Narcotics classes I have taken include training in
surveillance, operation of surveillance and electronic
investigatory equipment, field testing of drugs and drug
recognition. I have also received training in airport, bus
station, train station, and small package interdiction from
the Drug Enforcement Administration in 1995. I also received
further small package interdiction training during the Utah
Narcotics Officer's Association training conference in May
1995.
Other training at that conference included undercover
techniques, mexican methamphetamine, drug pipe line stops, and
drug related homicides.
I also received training at that
conference on Erez controlled substance detection sprays. As
an officer I have participated in hundreds of operations
involving the undercover purchase of narcotics and/or the
arrest of person for substance abuse related violations. I
have experience working undercover providing first hand
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experience with narcotics trafficking.
I have supervised
narcotics investigations for the Provo Police Department since
1992.
I am currently designated as the department
trainer/specialist
in
the
areas
of
fingerprinting,
surveillance,
video
equipment,
narcotics
and
drug
recognition.
On February 21, 1996, the United Parcel Service attempted to
deliver a package addressed to Roy Womack at 12 0 West 120 0
North, Orem, Utah. It was discovered that this address did
not exist. UPS employees discovered a Womack family in the
phone book living at 233 East 1000 South in Orem, Utah. Being
the only Womack listing in Orem, the package was delivered to
chat location. The package was sent from an Eileen O'Hara at
3002 Honolulu Avenue #18, La Crescenta, California, 91214.
The Womack family that received the package felt that the
package could be for them and that the name was simply wrong.
Therefore, the package was opened by the Womack1 s and
marijuana was discovered inside.
The package and its
contents, including the marijuana, were then taken to the Orem
Police Department by the Womack's. The approximate weight of
the marijuana found in the package is one ounce.
That on February 27, 1996, the United Parcel Service in
California received a call from an individual identifying
herself as Eileen O'Hara wondering where the package was that
she sent. A phone number was left with UPS in California.
UPS in California contacted UPS in Provo, Utah wanting
assistance in locating the package. A UPS employee in Provo,
Utah contacted the phone number given by Eileen O'Hara and did
in fact make contact with her. Eileen O'Hara was very irate
concerning the delivery of her package and was told where the
package was delivered and that the package would be recovered
and delivered at a new address given to UPS by Eileen O'Hara.
The new address of delivery given was 127 West 1200 North,
Orem, Utah.
That on February 27, 1996, the Womack family who received the
package originally received a visitor at their door who
identified himself as Roy Womack. This individual requested
the package that had been delivered to the address, but was
told that the package was not there. Later that same evening,
an individual who identified as Eileen O'Hara telephoned the
Womack residence requesting the package. She was advised also
that the package was not there.
That the new address of 127 West 1200 North is a good address.
Your affiant has learned through Orem utility records and Orem
Police Department records that the individual living at that
address is a John Green. Mountain Fuel utility records also
indicate that the individual living at that address is a
Kathleen Green.
The information from the Utah County
Sherifff s ^Oj£f ice is that Kathleen Green and John Green are
L'marrSed'^rA1' '.All/'
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6.

It is my experience that shipment of marijuana in this
quantity by UPS or mail is very common. The quantity often
being sold on the street is one eighth ounce. If sold at the
present sale price of $3 0 per one eighth ounce baggie, it
would sell for a street value of $240. One ounce if purchased
in that quantity would cost approximately $150 allowing a
potential profit of $90,

7.

Your affiant has conducted several searches of homes in Utah
County where it was found that drugs, including marijuana were
being sold from the home. In virtually every instance when
officers found narcotics, officers also located associated
paraphernalia and evidence including but not limited to
scales, buy/owe sheets, equipment for storage, packaging and
use of narcotics, cash, weapons, and other associated items.
Marijuana and other narcotics while quite valuable are very
small in volume and can be quickly and easily hidden in
clothing or destroyed if notice is given of intent to search.

8.

It is your affiant's desire to make a "controlled United
Parcel Service delivery" of this package to the residence
indicated by the shipping party. Your affiant would like to
conduct a search of the residence and the person of
individuals present immediately following the delivery to
recover
the narcotics
and
associated
evidence
while
determining who received the drugs.

9.

It is also your affiant's desire to search for evidence in the
house that shows possession of the home and a nexus to the
evidence.

10.

Your
affiant expects to locate additional
controlled
substances
in the residence
together
with
associated
paraphernalia and items used or capable of being used for the
storage, use, production, or distribution of controlled
substances.
Your affiant also expects to locate the UPS
package which is to be delivered which is further described as
a small cardboard box approximately 8" x 14" and 2-1/2" deep.
The package carries UPS delivery track number 1Z 926 986
081006 171 8 and is addressed to a Roy Womack.

11.

The residence is more particularly described as the home
located at 127 West 1200 North, Orem, Utah.
It is further
described as an older blue home with white trim.
It is
located on the south side of 1200 North and faces north. The
numerals "127" are posted on the front of the house.

12.

It my experience that persons who use and sell narcotics
commonly store narcotics and paraphernalia in vehicles,
Failure to search vehicles located on the premises together
with the curtilage, including outside storage units, boxes,
buildings, and enclosed areas will likely result in missing
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Following delivery of the package, your affiant desires to
conduct a search
of the residence to which the package is
delivered immediately following the delivery to look for the
narcotics/drugs and other relevant evidence including, but not
limited "to scales, buy/owe sheets, equipment for storage,
packaging and use of narcotics, cash, weapons, and other
associated items and evidence demonstrating use and possession
of the home and the contraband located.

Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by
this court authorizing the search of the residence, together with
the curtilage and the person of all individuals present within the
home and curtilage, and all vehicles located at said residence at
the time of search which by registration or indicia or use or
possession are owned or used by persons located at the address of
127 West 1200 North, Orem, Utah.
Dated this

day of February 19 96

{X^pJZ^\
ABPlANT-^rry Harper
Provo P a l a c e Department
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn before me on t h e
7^^**^

1996,

day of
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT
UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

A NARCOTICS
INVESTIGATION
127 West 1200
Orem, U t a h

:

SEARCH WARRANT
Criminal

No.

North

Defendants
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
Magistrate's
Endorsement

J&

1.

It has been established by oath or
affirmation made or submitted to me this
_J2^?^day of February 1996 that there is
probable cause to believe the following:
The property described below:
was unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed;
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of
being used to commit or conceal the commission of
an offense; or
is evidence of illegal conduct.

~

2.

The property described below is most probably
located at the premises also set forth below.

3.

The person or entity in possession of the property
is a party to the alleged illegal conduct.
That this warrant may be served without notice of
intent or authority to search, due to the fact that
the property to be searched for may be easily
secreted, disposed of, or destroyed if notice of
intent to search is given.
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NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed following
delivery of the UPS package containing marijuana described in the
affidavit to conduct a search of the residence to which the package
is
delivered
together with the
curtilage
including
any
outbuildings, vehicles, and the person of any individuals present
at the time of the execution of this warrant, including vehicles
belonging to those individuals.
You are directed to search for the presence of the following
property:
controlled substances, together with associated
paraphernalia, including items used or capable of being used for
the storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana and
other controlled substances, evidence that shows possession of the
home and a nexus to the evidence, as well as the UPS package that
is delivered and its contents.
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring
the property forthwith before me at the above Court or to hold the
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with
a written inventory of any property seized identifying the place
where the property is being held.
THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED:
^J&J

I N THE DAYTIME ONLY.

.^y^^^^-THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED WITHOUT
AUTHORITY OR INTENT.

GIVING NOTICE OF

THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE
OF ISSUANCE.
day of F e b r u a r y ,

DATED t h i s
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